Cook County’s Merits Brief Proves Gun-Grabbers Are Running Out of Moves in Viramontes
Cook County filed its merits brief today in Viramontes v. Cook County. I’ve been watching this case since the district court and the Seventh Circuit’s rubber-stamp affirmance. The brief is exactly what you’d expect from a jurisdiction that has spent decades treating the Second Amendment as a suggestion.
Their core claim is straightforward: the County’s ban on AR-15-platform and similar semiautomatic rifles fits within this nation’s historical tradition of regulating “unusually dangerous” weapons. They argue common use is not determinative, that these rifles are not in common use for any purpose that immunizes them from regulation, and that the ordinance is a reasonable response to the specific threat of mass-casualty events in a dense urban county.
Let’s take that apart honestly.
First, the historical analogues. Cook County reaches for Bowie knives, trap guns, “armed assemblies,” and various 18th- and 19th-century restrictions on certain knives and pistols. The problem is the fit is terrible. Bowie knife laws were never total possession bans in the way the County claims, most were limited in time and geography, and the most aggressive ones (like Alabama’s early transfer tax) did not last. Trap-gun restrictions were about methods—setting a firearm as a spring trap—not bans on entire classes of common arms. “Armed assemblies” is an even bigger stretch; if the existence of groups capable of mass violence justifies banning the most popular civilian rifle, then every modern firearm is on the chopping block. That is not how Bruen or Heller works.
The real historical analogues for the AR-15 are the repeating rifles of the late 19th century—Winchesters, Henrys, and the like. Those represented massive jumps in firepower over what came before. They were popular, commercially available, and never banned by states. Cook County mentions them in passing and moves on. That silence is telling.
Second, the “unusually dangerous / not for self-defense” argument. The brief leans heavily on mass-shooting statistics, lethality claims about the .223/5.56 cartridge, and the idea that these rifles collapse the destructive power of a “battalion” into one pair of hands. Some of the numbers are overstated or selectively framed. AR-platform rifles appear in a minority of mass shootings, not the dominant share sometimes claimed. More importantly, the Second Amendment does not require that a protected arm be the most common tool used in self-defense incidents, or that it be ideal for every scenario. Handguns are used far more often in self-defense and in crime. Under the County’s logic, that would justify banning them too—something Cook County and Chicago have already tried, and lost on.
The brief also insists that “common use” is not a shield. Heller and subsequent cases say otherwise for arms that are in common use for lawful purposes. The AR-15 platform is the most popular rifle in the country. Millions of law-abiding Americans own them for self-defense, competition, training, and yes, recreation. Treating that popularity as irrelevant or as evidence of danger inverts the constitutional test. Popularity among the people is not a bug; it is the point of the “common use” inquiry.
Third, the interest-balancing that still sneaks through. The brief talks about Cook County’s special density, stadiums, medical campuses, and “target-rich” environment. It argues the ordinance is narrowly tailored to a specific threat. That is policy language. Bruen rejected means-ends scrutiny of this sort for Second Amendment claims. Once the historical tradition test is applied and the analogues fail, the government’s preference for fewer rifles in civilian hands does not rewrite the Amendment.
Cook County still leaves ordinary rifles, shotguns, and handguns available. That is true. It does not save a ban on the most common rifle platform. Selective prohibition of popular arms is still a prohibition.
Oral argument is December 2. The United States has already filed as amicus supporting the petitioners. Multiple states have done the same. The County has assembled a large team and is leaning into every public-safety argument it can find. That is their job. Our job is to insist that the Constitution is not a suggestion that disappears when local officials decide certain arms are too effective.
The AR-15 is not a machine gun. It is not a weapon of war in the legal sense the County wants. It is a civilian rifle that happens to share design features with military models, just as the 19th-century repeaters did. If the Second Amendment protects anything beyond muskets and single-shot pistols, it protects this.
Cook County’s brief is thorough, polished, and ultimately unpersuasive under the Court’s own precedents. The Court should reverse.
I’ll keep following the filings and the argument. The reply brief is due November 20. Stay sharp.
Disclaimer: This post reflects the author’s personal analysis and advocacy as a Second Amendment supporter closely following Viramontes v. Cook County. It is not legal advice. The views expressed are those of the author and do not constitute formal legal opinion.